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JOURNAL OF APPLIED RESEARCH IN ACCOUNTING AND FINANCE

A STUDY OF ANALYST FORECAST RELIABILITY
IN AUSTRALIA
		

ALINA MAYDYBURA, DIONIGI GERACE & BRIAN ANDREW

The purpose of this paper is to determine whether time weighted consensus
estimates offer a more effective method for predicting company actual EPS
figures than simple mean or median analysis. The study aims to construct a
more comprehensive earnings forecast signal using analyst earnings forecasts
that have been weighted based on the timeliness of updates. Aimed at
extracting valuable information from timely analyst forecasts, the time weighted
earnings signal (TWES) methodology allows extracting valuable information
from analysts who possess some unique insights about the market and issue
their updates more frequently. One would expect the time signal to reflect a
more realistic representation of analyst estimate changes and thus be more
effective in predicting the companies’ reported EPS than the mean and median.
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INTRODUCTION
Accountants are interested in the production and use
of financial information. Consequently, a large number
of accounting and finance studies are concerned about
whether sophisticated users of financial data understand
such information and how they apply this knowledge
(Bradshaw, 2011). Traditionally, analysts use fundamental
analysis as an integral part of conducting an evaluation of
the market environment. The underlying hypothesis of this
study that fundamental stock analysis reflects a proposition
that investors tend to buy companies with particular
characteristics, where these characteristics are reflected
in fundamental accounting factors, such as earnings per
share, or EPS. Analysts obtain information by studying public
records and filings by the company. Financial analysts also
collect information by participating in public conference calls
and asking direct questions to the company management as
well as through small group or one-on-one meetings with
senior members of management teams.
The role of financial analysts is to assist their employers
and/or clients in making successful investment decisions. In
doing so analysts evaluate company financial statements and
assess commodity prices, sales, costs, expenses and tax rates
in order to determine a company’s fair value along with its
projected future earnings. They also use a range of financial
ratios calculated from the data obtained from the financial
statements that helps clients to evaluate the bottom line of
the company. Usually, as stated by Dunn and Nathan (2005),
financial analysts generally specialise by sector or industry,
which allows them to more closely follow recent trends in
business practices, products, as well as industry competition.
It is crucial that analysts keep abreast of new regulations or
policies that may affect the industry, as well as monitor the
economy to estimate its effect on earnings.
Research interest in analysts is great as a deeper
understanding of analysts’ behaviour is of interest to both
academics concerned with a working framework that
describes capital markets and practitioners who operate
in these markets. Investors with limited abilities or time to
analyse individual securities tend to rely on analysts’ reports.
Finally, regulators are interested in the flow of information
that facilitates functional and liquid markets, and analysts are
critical to this flow of information (Bradshaw, 2011). The
initial reason investors began examining analysts’ earnings
forecasts was to gauge their usefulness as a surrogate
for time-series forecasts in the studies on capital market
efficiency.Today financial analysts are inherently perceived as
an interesting economic agent in their own right (Bradshaw,
2011).
Typically, earnings revision models are formed by a simple
average of all analyst estimates and this is a well-known
strategy based on sell-side analyst forecasts. Importantly, the
aim of this paper is to use appropriate statistical methods
in order to extract additional information from detailed
analyst forecasts as they are updated.

The earnings revision signal adopted in this research
attempts to delve deeper into the detailed analyst forecasts
to detect early changes in the consensus by combining a
time weighted earnings signal (TWES) which favours more
recent revisions. Earnings revisions are an effective signal due
to the trending nature of analyst revisions and analysts are
likely to revise in steps in order to reduce reputation risk.
A change in the consensus earnings estimate will generally
lead to a share price rise or fall as the market digests the
information. This in turn leads other analysts in the market
to re-evaluate their estimates and herd towards the new
consensus. Earnings revisions are an attempt to detect when
this trend is underway. This paper attempts to pre-empt the
earnings revision signal and detect these changes early. We
therefore take advantage of the existing behavioural biases
in the earnings revision signal. The hypothesis being that
older earnings estimates contain less information than the
more recent earnings estimates. In the other models, when
following a mean or median approach, analyst earnings
estimates which have not changed for some time still
contribute the same weight towards the consensus as more
recent earnings estimates.
The remainder of the study is organised as follows. Section 2
includes a summary of some of the literature that provides
the background for this study. The data and methodology
used in the empirical tests are described in Section 3. In
Section 4 we report the results of the study and draw
some of the tentative conclusions as to the effectiveness of
the alternative consensus methodology in forecasting EPS.
Notably, Section 5 contains robustness tests to support the
results presented earlier in the paper. Finally, some of the
concluding remarks and possible future research directions
are suggested in Section 6 of the paper.
LITERATURE REVIEW
This paper adds to the literature in three major ways. First, as
a matter of fact, most studies conducted on analyst forecasts
relate to US firms and only a handful cover the topic of
analysts’ forecasting in other countries. This study extends
earlier research on evaluating analysts’ forecasts of EPS for
firms and does so by including a wide range of Australian
firms.
A second contribution of this study is such that it spans
a large sample period of twelve years, thus providing a
comprehensive historical coverage of the available data. In
addition, we include a much larger sample of companies
than any other previous academic study known to us. This
allows us to obtain more reliable and meaningful results
possibly generalisable to a wide range of other countries.
Third, in this piece of research we propose a more
sophisticated methodology for deriving estimated EPS
figures, as compared to simply relying on a mean or median.
As mentioned earlier, a fundamental assumption behind
the mean and/or median approach is that the available
forecasts impartially reflect the analysts’ private information.
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However, as evidence suggests, this is not always the case
(Trueman, 1994). Sometimes analysts choose to release
earnings forecasts that do not differ greatly from their own
prior expectations, even though their private information
justifies the more extreme earnings forecasts. In other
scenarios, analysts tend to report forecasts similar to those
previously released by other analysts, even when this is not
justified by the information they currently possess; that is,
analysts exhibit herding behaviour (Trueman, 1994). In
fact, Givoly and Lakonishok (1979) reveal that revisions of
various forecasters generally move together. These results
are shown to have interesting empirical implications. This
therefore goes to suggest that naively calculating a consensus
analyst forecast by either averaging or alternatively taking
the median of individual analyst forecasts is inappropriate.
Not all analysts are characterised by the same level of skills,
experience and frequency of updates. It is therefore crucial
to devise a more sophisticated distinguishing technique for
calculating predicted EPS consensus.
Behavioural Finance
In 2008–2009, ‘as financial markets responded to the
economic crisis fuelled by the collapse of subprime mortgage
backed securities, it appeared that finance theories could
not explain the vast fluctuations’ in the market (Stefan, 2009,
p.1). ‘Explanations of the random nature of the stock market
emerged from the field of behavioural finance, citing panic
and other investor sentiments as the key factors driving the
irrational state of the market’ (Stefan, 2009, p.1). Despite the
emphasis on the EMH in finance, there seems to be increasing
evidence of substantial anomalies in financial markets. These
suggest that the underlying principles of rational behaviour
underpinning the EMH may, in fact, be flawed. Some have
therefore begun to look into other elements present in
financial markets, including human behaviour. This has in
turn prompted the development of what is now known as
behavioural finance (Dargham, 2009). Behavioural finance
challenges the efficient markets perspective and focuses
on how various market participants interpret and act upon
information readily available to them.
According to Arnold and Orthman (2011), behavioural
finance is about the influence of psychology on market
participants and the subsequent effect thereof on the financial
markets. The notion behind human behaviour driving the
markets is not novel (Arnold and Orthman, 2011). Several
classical economists, including Adam Smith, Irving Fisher
and John Maynard Keynes emphasised the importance of
psychological factors in human decision-making, and how
these factors could change the analysis of economic issues
(Pech and Milan, 2009). Since then studies appear to confirm
the significance of the irrational human emotion — a
phenomenon so widely observed in the markets today and
which appears to be the key driver of the market. According
to Sewell (2011, p.1), ‘behavioural finance is the study of
the influence of psychology on the behaviour of financial
practitioners and the subsequent effect on markets’. Sewell
(2011) notes that behavioural finance is of interest because
34 / JARAF / VOLUME 8 ISSUE 2 2013

it helps to explain why and how markets might be inefficient.
Importantly, the behavioural finance literature falls into two
primary areas: the identification of anomalies in the EMH
that behavioural models may explain (DeBondt and Thaler,
1985) and the identification of individual investor behaviour
or bias inconsistent with classical economic theories of
rational behaviour (Odean, 1999).
Consistent with the EMH, it is argued that the anomalies
are chance results; apparent over-reaction to information is
as common as under-reaction (Sewell, 2011). In particular,
Kahneman and Tversky (1979, 1996, 2000) empirically show
that people are irrational in a consistent and correlated
manner. Importantly, Arnold and Orthman (2011, 7 Sep)
postulate that “a contributor to emotional behaviour” is
short-termism as (especially when under pressure) humans
tend to have an inherent preference for short-term activity
and outcomes”. For example, much of the behavioural
finance literature is pointing to people having a tendency of
being over-confident and over-emphasising the importance
of recent events (Arnold and Orthman, 2011).This can lead
to analysts using present conditions and recent trends to
make forecasts, even when they are unlikely to be normal.
This would effectively result in inaccurate forecasts. Further,
human liking for immediate gratification might mean that we
prefer observing positive outcomes sooner rather than later,
which may cause analysts and investors to track company
performance in the smallest time segments practicable
(Arnold and Orthman, 2011). This may, in turn, lead to an
unrealistic extreme short-term emphasis on performance,
and as a result, market participants would be likely to
make decisions based on a short-term fall or gain that is
unlikely to endure in the longer term (Arnold and Orthman,
2011). As a result, irrational investors will lose money and
incompetent analysts will lose their credibility and clientele,
and as a result, eventually exit the market (Sewell, 2011).
Advocates of behavioural finance say that market
inefficiencies are driven by human psychology. Clearly, it
would be impractical to assume that humans are 100%
rational 100% of the time. This is particularly evident
through people’s attitude to risk and the way they assess
probabilities. Psychologists have observed that when
making risky decisions, humans are particularly reluctant to
incur losses. Not surprisingly, most investors and analysts
do not hold a PhD in probability theory, neither can they
with absolute certainty predict the future. Therefore, they
may systematically make errors in assessing the probability
of uncertain events. Psychologists have found that when
judging possible future outcomes, individuals tend to look
back at what happened in a few similar situations and, as a
result, place too much weight on a small number of recent
events (Brealey et al, 2008). However, market participants
of this sort seem to forget how little one can learn about
the true market conditions purely on the basis of a shortterm glimpse.The tendency to place too much emphasis on
recent events, and therefore the underlying predisposition
to overreact to recent news, could explain some of the

most abrupt fluctuations in the market. In turn, behavioural
finance may offer some reasonable explanation of some
of the puzzles and anomalies surrounding the market. In
fact, the advocates of behavioural finance suggest that these
patterns of investor behaviour can explain why markets are
not always efficient.
Kahneman and Riepe (1998) find that market deviations
from the maxims of economic rationality are pervasive and
systematic. So market participants tend to deviate from
rationality. Further, according to Conlisk (1996), the concept
of rationality in the context of capital markets is empirically
very important because ‘there is a mountain of experiments
in which people may display intransitivity, ignore relevant
information or use irrelevant information’. In his book,
Shiller (2000) explains the irrational behaviour of market
participants. Importantly, the book was published just before
the most serious market collapse since the Great Depression
— the dot.com bubble. Among a number of important
factors, Shiller (2000) lists analysts’ optimistic forecasts as
a factor contributing to the irrational exuberance of the
recent bull market from August 1982 to. Notably, Trammel
(2006) argues that “theories about rational behaviour are
conspicuous targets for both practitioners and professors
of finance”.
Information Advantage of Financial Analysts
In the past couple of decades, financial analysts’ forecasts
have received increased attention in the finance and
accounting literature (Givoly and Lakonishok, 1979). They
have been widely used in empirical research to proxy for
investors’ earnings expectations (Hughes and Ricks, 1987;
McNichols, 1989). Other empirical research has focused on
comparing analysts’ forecast accuracy to that of both timeseries and publicly announced managerial forecasts (Brown
et al, 1987a; Brown and Rozeff, 1978; O’Brien, 1988). An
implicit assumption underlying much of this research is
that the forecasts publicly released by analysts reflect their
private information in an unbiased manner.
Security analysts are a type of financial intermediary whose
immediate concern is the valuation of assets. Thus, they are
primarily investment advisors. Because of possible conflicts
of interest between investors (principals) and corporate
management (agents), analysts also have a stewardship role
and may at times serve as corporate critics (De Bondt,
1991). Security analysts prepare detailed studies of individual
stocks, make careful comparisons between companies
(resulting in industry reports), and form expert opinions on
their likely future earnings and investment performance. At
the company level, the principal source of information for
analysts is financial statement analysis. As a rule, they tend to
access a wide array of information, including security prices,
firm-specific financial and operating information, industry
data and macroeconomic factors. As the name itself
suggests, the value-added activity of the analyst is analysis,
which encompasses the process through which analysts
consider a company’s strategy, accounting policies, financial

performance, future prospects for sales and earnings
growth, and ultimately a valuation. Based on this, analysts
draw conclusions in the form of earnings forecasts.
The abundance of literature on financial analysts ultimately
points to the difference between the historical academic
perspective and investor interest in future events (O’Brien,
1985). The research question addressed by this study is
motivated by a common academic use of analyst forecast
data which is as a proxy for the market expectation
of a firm’s earnings at a given point in time. Accurate
measurement of earnings expectations is crucial for firm
valuation, determining cost of capital and understanding
the relationship between unanticipated earnings and stock
price changes. Research on financial analysts has developed
as a by-product of capital markets research focused on
the correlation between accounting earnings and stock
prices. In fact, a lot of studies on financial forecasting focus
on examining the correlation between inputs (prices and
financial statement information) and outputs (earnings
forecasts and recommendations) (Fried and Givoly, 1982;
Brown et al, 1987b). The two methods of estimating
expected earnings data that are generally used in studies
of divergent earnings are analysts’ forecasts and time series
models.
The interest in tests of market efficiency and value relevance
of accounting earnings has prompted a significant amount
of research on time-series modelling of earnings. In this
respect, Fried and Givoly (1982) are often given credit as
their research supports the conclusion that analysts are
a better proxy for expected earnings than time-series
models. On one hand, as noted by Brown et al (1987a), if
analysts are efficient in any sense, it has to be the case that
analysts’ forecasts are more accurate than time-series model
forecasts, because analysts have both the timing and the
information advantages. In this regard, Grossman and Stiglitz
(1980) observe that market prices cannot fully reflect all
available information; otherwise, information gatherers like
security analysts would not be rewarded for their costly
activities. One would assume that analysts can easily obtain
a time-series model and incorporate that information into
their overall information set (Bradshaw, 2011).
The rational expectations hypothesis suggests that market
earnings expectations should be measured by the best
available earnings forecasts (Brown and Rozeff, 1978).
Meanwhile, both basic economic theory and the equilibrium
employment of analysts imply that being a higher cost than
time series models, analysts must produce better forecasts
(Brown and Rozeff, 1978). Since security analysts process
substantially more data than the time series of past earnings,
their earnings forecasts should be superior to time series
forecasts and provide better measures of market earnings
expectations. Aggregate analyst earnings forecasts have been
found to be more accurate than forecasts from time-series
models in numerous studies (Fried and Givoly, 1982; Brown
and Rozeff, 1978; Brown et al, 1987a; Philbrick and Ricks,
JARAF / VOLUME 8 ISSUE 2 20123 / 35
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1991). In that regard, Brown et al (1987a) agree with the
rest of the literature but point out that even though analysts’
forecasts are more reliable than time-series forecasts, the
prediction errors are large in both cases. In this paper, we
aim to present a method allowing one to achieve a smaller
prediction error than that derived from the widely available
generic consensus measures.
Earnings Per Share
According to Schallke (1962, p.670), the “concept of income
constitutes a controversial and complex part of accounting
theory, being an area which has important implications for
practice”. It is an essential characteristic of our economy that
results often do not accord with expectations. Any plan, no
matter how well conceived, can be disrupted by unforeseen
events and circumstances. Thus, plans are made and the
economy moves on the basis of expectations, but actual
results may differ from the predicted ones (Schallke, 1962,
p.670). As said by a well-known economist Adam Smith, it is
expectations which are controlling, rather than results. From
this follows the significance of ex ante, or expected income
in the eyes of economists. One important feature is the fact
that ex ante calculations are not irrevocable as they can be
revised and changed from time to time in order to conform
to actual conditions (Schallke, 1962, p.671).
Inevitably, the subject of forecasting financial variables has
received wide attention in the last few decades (Crichfield
et al, 1978). In fact, “continuing effort is being directed
toward the improvement of accounting practices in order
to present more meaningful financial statements” (Axelson,
1975, p.43). Expected income is a valuable tool in predicting
the direction of a firm, an industry, and taken collectively,
the economy. In terms of its impact on capital markets,
empirically the annual earnings number is the single most
important piece of information that the firm releases
(Brown et al, 1985). Similarly, according to Richards (1976),
the most common security valuation technique employed
today involves an expected future earnings figure which is
capitalised at an appropriate rate (multiplier) to provide an
expected future price for a security. As said by Francis (1972),
the true economic value of the firm depends on its earnings
prospects, in light of anticipated economic conditions. There
has been growing concern by both the regulators and the
private investment community over the earnings forecasts
which are the basis of these valuation models.
According to Axelson (1975, p.42), “the two numbers most
used by equity investors today are earnings per share and
the price-to-earnings ratio”, which are essentially the inverse
of each other. As Axelson (1975, p.42), further highlights,
“trends in these two numbers are carefully analysed, and
predictions of future trends often play a decisive role in
investment decisions”. These numbers are important tools
enabling one to quantify the evaluation of investment
value (Axelson, 1975). In fact, the earnings per share figure
serves as a common language for describing the securities
of different companies (Axelson, 1975). It seems that this
36 / JARAF / VOLUME 8 ISSUE 2 2013

figure is so widely followed that small changes in the trend
of earnings can have an immediate and significant impact on
the market value of securities.
The overwhelming mass of detail that ends up being
published in annual reports is often so technical that it
ultimately tends to confuse rather than clarify the company’s
performance for individual investors (Axelson, 1975).
Forecasts are currently available from professional security
analysts and from company management. In addition, recent
growth in detailed disclosure has increased the interest
in simplistic measures of investment value and, as a result,
placed even greater reliance on such accounting measure of
performance as EPS (Axelson, 1975). An extensive body of
literature has examined the information content of earnings.
In fact, Givoly and Lakonishok (1979, p.165) find that financial
analysts’ forecast revisions convey or reflect information.
Furthermore, the authors provide evidence to suggest that
the “information on revisions in forecasts of EPS is valuable
to investors”. According to Crichfield et al (1978, p.652),
“an implied purpose of EPS forecasts provided by security
analysts is to yield unbiased estimates of future earnings per
share which would be useful for investors in assessing firms’
equilibrium values”.
Analysts and the Agency Problem
Following the development and increasing accessibility of
databases containing analysts’ EPS forecasts, many studies
have analysed their quality. An implicit assumption underlying
much of this research is that the forecasts publicly released
by analysts reflect their private information in an unbiased
manner. In contrast, numerous studies document that analysts’
forecasts of earnings, on average, exhibit over-optimism
and end up being too high (Abarbanell and Bernard, 1992;
Easterwood and Nutt, 1999; McDonald, 1973; Barefield
and Comiskey, 1975; Fried and Givoly, 1982; Stickel, 1990;
Lys and Sohn, 1990). A panel of previous researchers has
documented that analyst forecasts are optimistically biased
(O’Brien, 1988; Butler and Lang, 1991; Philbrick and Ricks,
1991; Abarbanell, 1991).
In a study of whether security analysts overreact, De
Bondt and Thaler (1990) found that analysts’ forecasts are
prone to be too optimistic and too extreme. The authors
concluded that analysts over-react to past earnings changes,
resulting in forecasts that are over-optimistic. De Bondt and
Thaler (1990) provide evidence to suggest that analysts’
earnings forecasts are indeed consistent with “generalised
overreaction”. Specifically, the authors show that earnings
changes forecasted by analysts are significantly more
extreme than actual realisations, and conclude that the
forecasts seem too extreme to be considered rational (De
Bondt and Thaler, 1990). Naturally, the optimism bias may
simply reflect an economic incentive to encourage trading.
Alternatively, the bias may be due to pressure from company
management. Importantly, the overreaction bias is more
severe for long-term forecasts (Graham, 1959). Further, in
their investigation of earnings forecasts for 100 companies,

Barefield and Comiskey (1975) concluded that forecast
earnings have exceeded actual earnings in 64% of the cases
(Barefield and Comiskey, 1975). The study by Jaggi and Jain
(1998) shows that, on an overall basis, analyst forecasts are
generally biased towards overstatement.
Importantly, we acknowledge the apparently disparate
conclusions in the literature (Abarbanell and Bernard,
1992). In particular, studies involving earnings forecasts that
are not consistent with the apparently persistent optimistic
bias include Theil (1966), Lys and Sohn (1990), Abarbanell
(1991), Easterwood and Nutt (1999) as well as Lys and
Sohn (1990) who found that analysts’ forecasts underreact
to information in issuing financial forecasts. Similarly, Brown
and Rozeff (1978), Fried and Givoly (1982), Brown et al
(1985 and 1987), O’Brien (1988) and Brown et al (1985)
also found that analysts underestimate actual EPS. Notably,
Theil (1966, p.14), states that “generally speaking, forecasters
tend to underestimate changes more frequently than they
overestimate them.”
Overall, there does not appear to be consensus in the
financial literature on whether analysts over- or under-react
to information. Thus, it could be argued that analysts tend
to be fairly inefficient in processing numerous pieces of
information. Such evidence of inefficient analysts’ earnings
forecasts by DeBondt and Thaler (1990) and Mendehall
(1991) raises an overall question of analysts’ forecast
reliability.
Analysts’ Forecast Reliability
Analyst forecasting accuracy is of importance not only to
investors willing to invest in those stocks, but also to the
underlying companies themselves. If the estimates for a
particular company are not accurate, this would affect that
stock’s liquidity, as not many investors would be willing to
trade in such stocks. Essentially, the association between
security returns and analyst forecast revisions suggests that
investors extract relevant information about upcoming
earnings from analyst forecasts. Unsurprisingly, a vast
majority of research on analysts is focused on their ability
to forecast earnings (Clement and Tse, 2005; Mikhail et al,
1987). Existing research indicates that the most important
trait valued by institutional investors is industry knowledge,
which explains why most analysts specialise by industry.
Clearly, analysts are valued for their ability to see individual
companies within the context of the industry. As Mikhail et
al (1987) highlight, individual analyst experience increases
forecast accuracy. According to Clement and Tse (2005), the
likelihood of analyst earnings forecasts increases with the
analyst’s prior accuracy and experience, and declines with
the number of industries the analyst follows.
An implicit assumption behind much of the empirical
research involving security analyst earnings forecasts is such
that these forecasts reflect the analysts’ private information
in an unbiased manner. However, Trueman (1994) shows
that this much desired assumption may not necessarily

be valid. In this regard, Clement and Tse (2005) classify
forecasts as bold if they are away from both the analyst’s
own prior forecast and the consensus forecast or below
both. The authors classify all other forecasts that move
away from the analyst’s own prior forecast and toward the
consensus as herding forecasts. Clement and Tse (2005)
find that bold forecasts are on average more accurate than
herding forecasts, as bold forecasts incorporate analysts’
private information and are more informative to investors
than herding forecasts. Herding happens when analysts
revise their forecasts simply to be closer to the consensus
forecast, or other analysts, or both and not because of new
private information (Clement and Tse, 2005; Gleason and
Lee, 2003). In fact, Givoly and Lakonishok (1979, p.171)
“reveal that revisions of various forecasters do generally
move together”.These results are shown to have interesting
empirical implications. In related research, Trueman (1990)
shows that, upon obtaining new information, analysts may
also be reluctant to revise previously issued forecasts. This is
because a forecast revision would signal to the market that
the analyst’s original information was inaccurate, which as a
result may lower the perceived assessment of the analyst’s
forecasting ability. This therefore goes to suggest that
naively calculating a consensus analyst forecast by averaging
individual analyst forecasts is inappropriate.
An interesting artefact in regard to herding is the persistent
trending in forecast earnings revisions. Upward revisions tend
to be followed by additional revisions in the same direction,
and the same is true for downgrades. For example, when
analysts first raise their forecasts for a stock, some investors
will buy and the price will rise. When secondary analysts
follow, there will be more buying and a further price rise.
As stated by Jacobs and Levy (1989, p.6), “this persistence
of estimate revisions leads to persistence” in market moves.
The reasoning behind trending in forecast earnings revisions
is addressed next.
First, due to credibility concerns, individual analysts tend
to be averse to forecast reversals, especially when their
current view differs from consensus. Suppose an analyst had
been forecasting $2 of earnings per share, but now believes
the best estimate to be $1. Rather than admitting to a
bad forecast, the analyst will be motivated to reduce the
forecast in smaller increments. Second, analysts who suffer
from conservatism do not adjust their earnings forecasts
sufficiently in response to new information contained in
earnings announcements. Third and important, analysts
are more concerned about how accurate their forecast
is relative to other analysts, rather than how close their
individual forecast is to reality. Thus, revising their forecast
to a more conservative number will ensure that all upside
will be captured if the information is correct, without losing
much credibility if the information is wrong.
Relating analysts’ tendency to herd to their experience,
Hong et al (2000) find that more experienced analysts are
less likely to herd. Similarly, research finds that analysts issuing
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bold forecasts are on average employed by large brokerages,
issue more frequent forecasts, and have greater firm-specific
and general experience (Hong and Kubik, 2003; Trueman,
1994; Clement, 1999). In contrast, analysts issuing herding
forecasts tend to cover more companies and industries.
Consistent with empirical evidence, Hong et al (2000),
Scharfstein and Stein (1990) and Stickel (1990) find that
experienced analysts are more likely to issue bold forecasts
than their less experienced colleagues. In particular,Trueman
(1994) proposes that herding declines with the analyst’s
experience. This suggests that inexperienced analysts are
less likely to provide extreme forecasts and tend to herd
more frequently. In turn, investors view bold forecasts as
more informative than the more generic herding forecasts.
As it became generally accepted that analysts have status
of an important economic agent in the capital markets,
academics became interested in a deeper understanding of
analysts’ forecasts and their underlying reliability. Forecasting
company earnings is difficult but very important (De Bondt,
1991). Numerous studies examine the differences between
actual and expected or divergent earnings (Doran, 2000;
Brown and Rozeff, 1978; Fried and Givoly, 1982; Brown et
al, 1987b; Phibrick and Ricks, 1991; Barelield and Comiskey,
1975; Basi et al, 1976; Crichfield et al, 1978). The study
by Lui (1992) evaluates the ability of security analysts to
forecast the EPS for firms in Hong Kong and concludes that
analysts’ forecasts are significantly biased and inaccurate.The
study by McDonald (1973) provides additional empirical
information on the reliability of earnings predictions.
Reliability was examined by comparing predicted earnings
with actual earnings for the same period. Reliability in this
study was based on the degree of agreement between
predicted earnings and actual earnings. Therefore, reliability
was not used by McDonald (1973) in the sense of declaring
predicted earnings reliable or unreliable, but was used in the
sense of the degree of closeness to being right.
Earnings forecasts by professionals are generally believed
to be valuable information and their accuracy is a matter
of concern to a wide range of market participants. The
primary use of analyst earnings forecasts in academic work
is to provide a proxy for the market expectation of a future
earnings realisation (O’Brien 1985). Forecast aggregations,
such as the mean or median, are often used for this purpose.
These proxies, however, assume that analysts have identical
forecasting abilities, so the identity of the individual analyst is
ignored in defining the consensus (O’Brien, 1985). However,
if some analysts produce consistently superior or inferior
forecasts, then such knowledge can be used to improve the
accuracy of the consensus measure. If analysts update at
different times and do not differ in their forecasting ability,
then under mild assumptions the most recent forecast
available may be more meaningful. However, if analysts differ
systematically in forecasting ability, there will be a tradeoff between the age of the forecast and the ability of the
forecaster (O’Brien, 1985).
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Existing research shows that forecast accuracy generally
improves as the forecasting horizon decreases (Brown et
al, 1985; O’Brien, 1988 and 1990). So if analyst forecasts
are non-synchronous, then the more recent forecasts may
incorporate more information and should be more accurate
than their out-dated precedents (O’Brien 1985). If the
older forecasts are simply irrelevant, then discarding them
is appropriate (O’Brien, 1985). Thus, it would flow that the
longer the forecast horizon, the greater the disagreement
among security analysts in their earnings forecasts (Lui,
1992).This is reasonable because the more distant the future
the more difficult it is to make accurate forecasts. Jaggi and
Jain (1998) also show that analyst forecasts with shorter
time horizons are more accurate than forecasts with longer
time horizons. Another interesting factor possibly affecting
the outcome of our research is the notion that forecast age
varies in significance from sector to sector. Moreover, prior
literature suggests that analysts’ forecasts become more
accurate as the reporting date is approaching thus further
pointing to the increasing forecast accuracy with time.
Data and Methodology
Data
The data used in this study includes primary earnings
per share (EPS) before extraordinary items, and where
necessary, these EPS figures have been adjusted for stock
splits and dividends. To calculate basic EPS, the company’s
net income is divided by the number of shares outstanding
. We empirically test which one of the following consensus
estimates is the closest predictor of company actual EPS
figures: mean, median, or the time weighted consensus. In
pursuit of the more effective consensus estimates, we use
longitudinal time series daily individual analyst reports for
12financial years covering 2000 to 2011. We are concerned
with the performance of security analysts over a relatively
long period of time.This differs from most published studies
of forecasts which deal with a smaller number of years .
The original dataset for each country comprises 1121
Australian companies for 12 years from 2000 to 2011. The
average number of analysts per company is 5.31 (mean)
and 4.45 (median). “The number of forecasts per company
varies considerably and, in general, is a positive function of
the size and investment interest” (Barefield and Comiskey,
1975, p.242). This study covers Australia for 12 years and
we believe this provides a good testing ground for a more
advanced EPS forecast signal.The data for the purpose of this
research came from the Thompson Reuters database. The
testing sample of companies is limited to stocks covered by
a minimum of three analysts. It is assumed that updates by
at least three analysts are required to provide a reasonable
consensus.
Methodology
Analysts provide various forecast estimates for listed
companies. One would expect that these estimates will differ
as each analyst holds differing outlooks and assumptions

about the company. These individual forecasts are often
aggregated to form a market consensus for each company.
Traditional earnings revision models measure changes in
the equal weighted average consensus of analyst estimates
over time. Thus, the standard earnings consensus is formed
from an equally weighted consensus of all the latest analyst
estimates. However, not all estimates are equal. To improve
on the standard earnings revision models, we adjust the
individual analyst estimates to form the time weighted
earnings signal (TWES) by placing a greater weighting on
the more recent forecasts. With the aim of extracting extra
information from the analyst forecasts, this measure aims
to enhance the reliability of analyst consensus estimates of
company EPS.
Increased interest in corporate earnings forecasts has
encouraged the flow of forecast information from a variety
of sources. A primary problem encountered in the use of
this information is determining who among the forecasters
is a better performer. In situations where multiple forecasts
are available for a given corporation, investors have a choice
of strategies. One such strategy would be to use the mean of
all available forecasts. At the other extreme, investors could
try to determine which of the forecasts is most reliable and
only use that one. The purpose of this paper is to detect
which one of the following techniques – mean, median, or
time weighted – consensus estimate offers the most reliable
method for predicting company actual EPS figures.
The study focuses on the more comprehensive earnings
forecast signal using analyst earnings forecasts to detect early
changes in analysts’ revisions.To extract valuable information
from timely analyst forecasts, the time signal methodology
allows delving deeper into the analyst forecasts to detect early
changes in the consensus signal and produce a robust time
weighted earnings estimate. In particular, the study examines
the effectiveness of analyst earnings forecasts that have been
weighted based on a time period of 100 days. Spanning over
12 years from 2000 to 2011, the mean time that an average
analyst takes to update their EPS forecast estimate is 91
days. With the mean being 91 days and considering that one
would expect some leeway for earnings updates by analysts,
we believe that adopting the 100 day “cut-off ” benchmark
is a reasonable assumption. Notably, the average number of
days required by an analyst to issue a new forecast was 95
days in the first half of the tested period, spanning from 2000
to 2005, it then decreased to 84 days in the second half of
the tested period, lasting from 2006 to 2011. We therefore
observe a decline in the number of days it takes an analyst
to update their forecast, when moving from the first half of
observations to the second. Possible explanations for this
could be technological advances, increased media coverage
and greater data availability.

is a forecast error, the two hypotheses laid out in the paper
are described below. They postulate that time-weighted
consensus estimates are a more robust alternative to mean
and median consensus figures.
(1)

H0 : FE Time weighted ≤ FE Mean 				
H1 : FE Time weighted > FE Mean;

(2)

H0 : FE Time weighted ≤ FE Median 				
H1 : FE Time weighted > FE Median;

The focus of the study is on quantitative data analysis
techniques. The paper investigates the field of security
analysis where the main emphasis is on the quantifiable
aspects of the stock screening process, while attempting
to minimise the importance of the more qualitative factors
of corporate performance. Accordingly, a combination
of empirical studies and statistical analysis tools will be
implemented as the principal methodologies for conducting
this research.
Effectively, this paper builds on research on the time
and directional signal in Australia. The study presents an
analysis of 11 sectors: Basic Materials, Capital Goods,
Cyclical, Energy, Financials, Health, Non-Cyclical, Services,
Technology, Transport and Utilities. Table 1 provides a
sector composition by the number of companies per
sector. The sectors considered in this study are categorised
using the Thomson Reuters methodology known as the
Reuters Business Sector Schema (RBSS). Notably, RBSS is
a classification system designed to track and display the
primary business of a corporation and grouping highly
related products and services into a single industry category.
Appendix A elaborates on the sector classification by
industry to provide a better understanding of the range of
companies belonging to each sector.

One would expect the time signal to reflect a more realistic
representation of analyst estimate changes and thus be
more effective in predicting company reported EPS than
the mean and median-based consensus. Considering that FE
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Table 1. Sector Composition by the Number of Companies Per Sector
Sector
Basic Materials
Capital Goods
Cyclical
Energy
Financials
Health
Non-Cyclical
Services
Technology
Transport
Utilities
TOTAL

No of Companies
239
82
24
116
101
86
48
305
79
20
21
1121

Methods
In constructing the time weighted earnings signal (TWES), the idea is to place more weight on the more recent earnings
estimates. The rationale for adopting the time weighting method in the study is that the most recent revisions are more
reflective of where the market sees the stocks. For different reasons, not all analysts are as timely in updating their forecasts.
Time weighting may also act as a data cleaning exercise for stocks where the analyst has left their brokerage firm or dropped
coverage. One would assume that the average time between analysts updating their estimates varies throughout the year and
can be different depending on the size of the company and its geographical location. In constructing the time weighted EPS
signal, the weights of analyst forecasts are based on the amount of time that has passed since the analyst has last changed their
forecasts. Fig. 1 is an illustration of this process.
Figure I. Time-weighted Consensus Signal with the Application of a Linear Weighting Scale
Weight

Age of Estimate
A linear time period going back 100 days is used. For example, if an analyst revised today, their EPS forecast receives a weight
of one; if an analyst last revision was 100 days ago, they receive zero weight; if analyst revised 50 days ago, they receive half
weight etc. Appendix B provides more insight into how the time-weighted measures are calculated.
Forecasting is one useful means for estimating the values of important variables under uncertainty. A forecast, or prediction, is
simply a statement about an unknown event and typically, as appears in our case, they are future events. In the present study,
we are concerned with security analyst predictions of EPS figures for major corporations. There is likely to be some sample
bias due to the limited coverage of firms by companies providing forecast data. This bias is toward a greater coverage of large
and somewhat more mature firms that likely have had a sufficient number of analysts covering them. For this reason, any
conclusions to different populations should be made with care. We will evaluate the accuracy of these forecasts as compared
to predictions from alternative statistical models in terms of the magnitude of the forecast error.
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The time period selected for this study is for years 2000
through to 2011.This time frame exhibits differing economic
conditions, which aids in making the results of the study
more generalisable. As part of data requirements, only
companies covered by at least three analysts are included in
the study. Importantly, a similar parameter is adopted by Lui
(1992). Thus, the analysis begins from the date when there
are at least three analysts until the day when the company
announces its end of financial year results.

EPS forecast, where DE % = [A − F] / F (Doran, 2000).
Studies that scrutinise divergent earnings (or forecast error)
commonly employ the methodology of deflating divergent
earnings measures (Brown and Kim, 1991; Bowen et al, 1992;
Doran, 1995). This indicates that the common practice of
deflating earnings data is necessary. As explained above, we
believe that the need to use deflated and absolute values
in determining the forecast error across a large sample of
companies with varying levels of EPS.

The accuracy of forecasts in this study is examined by using
the forecast error measures to reflect the difference between
forecast and actual values of EPS. To measure the accuracy
of forecasts on an average basis, the absolute forecast error
measure is used, which is deflated by an absolute amount of
actual values. Therefore, the forecast error is defined as the
absolute value of the percentage difference between actual
and forecasted earnings, such that:

The ultimate question the study attempts to address is
whether alternative consensus methodology is superior to
the usual mean and median scenario so widely adopted in
the financial industry, but learning about the different results
on a sector basis as well as analysing year-by-year variations
in the countries’ economic cycles would provide the reader
with a deeper understanding of the results obtained from
the study.

FE % = (Fcons − A)/A
where A is the actual EPS, and Fcons is the EPS consensus
forecast.
To account for the effect that some of the extreme
observations would have on the summary statistics, we
adjust the data for outliers. Accordingly, observations with
absolute forecast errors above 100% are removed from the
analysis. Similarly, in discussing the research design of their
study, Jaggi and Jain (1998) and Foster (1986) argue that
firms with forecast errors over 200% should be dropped
from further analysis.
Importantly, standard statistical tools invariably require the
successive elements in any summation to be independent.
This assumption, however, is unrealistic if the forecast errors
are measured in terms of levels of EPS. As the level of EPS
increases in absolute magnitude, we should likewise expect
analysts’ forecast errors to increase in absolute magnitude.
In a cross-sectional sense, performance measures which
evaluate differences between the levels of forecast EPS and
the levels of actual EPS would be biased against firms with
high absolute levels of EPS and biased in favour of firms
with low absolute levels of EPS. This would make empirical
results based upon such measures difficult to interpret.Thus,
to avoid asymmetry problems, we chose to work in terms
of percentage changes in EPS. If one does not use absolute
values for both the numerator and the denominator, then
the use of this measurement scheme produces a positive
number for over-predictions and a negative number for
under-predictions. This can be seen in McDonald (1973)
who refers to the forecast error as the ‘relative prediction
error’, defined as FE % = [A − F] / F .

According to Doran (2000, p.125), “divergent earnings are
those that differ from expected”. Divergent earnings (DE)
is the undeflated measure where DE = A – F, and DE% is
divergent earnings deflated by the absolute value of the

RESULTS
In this section we examine whether the time weighted
consensus estimates provide a better alternative to the
mean and median consensus estimates. Reflecting on the
methodology section, technically, there is a scale problem
in measuring analysts’ forecast errors when using the data
measured in its level form. This problem can persist across
firms and over time. So a firm with the same total earnings
as another but half as many shares outstanding will have
an EPS that is twice as large. To adjust for differences in
the magnitude of EPS and forecast errors across firms, it
is necessary to use a deflator, such as dividing the forecast
error by the actual value.
In applying the parameters described in the methodology
section, by including only stocks covered by at least
three analysts and removing the outliers whose absolute
percentage error exceeds 100%, we find that the number of
companies decreases by 40%, from 1121 to 668.
In using the t-test in the context of larger samples involving
50 or more observations, the distribution is approximately
normal. To further strengthen the results of the study, we
test the statistical significance of the differences using the
paired t-test method. As the t-statistic in all cases was
greater than 2, we can conclude that there is a statistically
significant difference between the variables observed.
In using a linear time period going back 100 days and placing
greater weight on the more recent analyst EPS forecast
estimates, the results of the study indicate that on average,
the 100 day time weighted consensus measure (from now
on we shall refer to it as the 100 day TWES) is superior to
both median and mean. In fact, across all the years studied,
the 100 day TWES ranks as the number one consensus
approach (average FE = 24.3%), followed by the median
(average FE = 25.9%), and the mean (average FE = 28.0%)
which ranks as the least accurate technique for calculating
consensus.
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Overall on a sector basis, the 100 day TWES (average FE = 24.3%) acts as the closest predictor of company EPS in all sectors.
The only exception is Utilities where the median is the most reliable prediction method of corporate earnings (average FE =
22.4%), followed closely by the mean (average FE = 22.6%) and the 100 day TWES (average FE = 22.4%) comes last (average
FE = 24.4%). In this one case, it is the median that acts as a better proxy of reported EPS than the 100 day TWES. The utilities
sector has a very small number of companies, thus reducing the significance of this result. Table 2 below summarises these
findings.
Table 2. Time-Weighted Consensus Results By Sector
Sector

Mean

Median

Basic Materials

Number of
Companies
116

38.3%

33.7%

100 Day
TWES
32.1%

Capital Goods

54

24.1%

23.6%

21.1%

Cyclical

12

29.7%

26.9%

24.5%

Energy

65

38.7%

36.7%

33.7%

Financials

63

22.6%

22.1%

21.2%

Health

35

29.1%

26.2%

24.5%

Non-Cyclical

38

24.7%

23.2%

22.0%

Service

219

22.5%

20.9%

19.2%

Technology

34

26.9%

22.6%

22.3%

Transport

16

32.1%

32.9%

32.0%

Utilities

16

22.6%

22.4%

24.4%

Total/Average

668

28.3%

26.5%

25.2%

ROBUSTNESS TESTS
To strengthen our research results, we performed a number
of additional tests. Our aim was to make sure that the time
weighted methodology is superior to simple benchmarks
such as mean or median regardless of the chosen cut-off
age of the estimate. To add to the 100 day benchmark
established throughout the study, we also ran tests where
the maximum age of the estimate was 50 and 150 days.
Such tests supported our earlier proposition that the time
weighted methodology was in fact a more reliable predictor
of the actual EPS than simple arithmetic benchmarks.
Interestingly, the statistical differences between the 50, 100
and 150 day results are not significant.
In addition to testing the linear model with the time period
going back 100 days, we also tested a number of exponential
models. The robustness tests based on the exponential
models tended to support the superiority of the time
weighted approach over the mean and median method but
did not result in lower forecast errors. We thus conclude
that using the linear time weighted consensus model allows
the achievement of a more reliable consensus overall than
that derived from the exponential time weighted consensus
models.
Interestingly, Clement and Tse (2005) found that analysts
have difficulty forecasting earnings for firms that are
currently reporting losses. To further strengthen our results,
we examined the potential effects of some of the major
economic turmoils of the 21stcentury, such as the GFC
of 2008-2009 and the dot.com bubble of 2000-2001, on
the forecasting accuracy and the magnitude of the forecast
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error. Not surprisingly, the results of the study show that in
2000 as well as 2008-2009, the percentage forecast error
was higher than in other years. A valuable conclusion for
our study here is that despite the variations in the size of
the forecast error and in spite of the different economic
regimes around, the 100 day TWES (average FE = 23.9%)
continues to provide robust consensus methodology, and
in fact outperforms the median (average FE = 26.0%) and
mean average (FE = 28.0%) throughout the twelve-year
period considered in the study.
It has been well documented in the finance literature that
in times of economic downturns when EPS tends to be
negative, analysts’ forecast errors become larger than under
the business-as-usual scenario. Continuing from the previous
findings, we make an attempt to ensure that the time
weighted methodology remains a more reliable alternative
to the mean and median methods at times when EPS is
negative and go on to conduct some additional testing. The
results show that 132 companies out of the original 1121
firms have cases when an EPS is negative. When this is the
case, the consensus forecast errors tend to sky-rocket, with
the mean showing an average FE of 52.6%, median average
FE = 46.4% and the 100 day TWES reaching an average FE
of 44.1%.
Such empirical evidence goes to suggest two things when
EPS is negative. First, the time weighted methodology
continues to be a more reliable alternative to the mean and
median methods. The second finding is such that analysts’
forecast errors are significantly larger when earnings are
negative. In fact, in times of significant economic hardships,

the 100 day TWES forecast error is significantly lower than
the forecast error derived from the mean or median.
The robustness tests performed provide evidence in favour
of the superiority of the time weighted consensus method
over the mean and the median consensus approach. This
outcome holds true across most sectors and financial years,
as well as during the times of economic downturns, such as
the GFC or the dot.com bubble, for example. This supports
the results presented earlier in the paper.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
Security analysts play an important role in capital markets.
As information intermediaries, they provide quantitative
outputs for investors in the form of earnings forecasts.
Believed to be the proxy of rational expectations, analysts’
forecasts of firms’ earnings and the related forecast errors
are issues widely discussed in finance and accounting
literature. By underlining the critical role of estimated
earnings in stock valuation, research suggests that analyst
earnings forecast revisions convey significant information to
the market. In fact, earnings forecast accuracy is described
by the Institutional Investor and the Wall Street Journal as
the determining quality of top-ranked analysts. Importantly,
as highlighted by Schipper (1991), an accurate earnings
forecast is not merely an end in itself but a tool to gauge the
investment potential of a company’s stock.
Importantly, the timeliness of the forecasts and forecast
accuracy are an interesting trade-off faced by analysts
who issue forecasts. They need to choose between either
promptly releasing forecasts with respect to new information
or waiting in order to produce more accurate forecasts at
some point in the future by obtaining additional information.
In this paper we examine the analysts forecast error, defined
as the difference between actual and forecast earnings. We
compare whether – in measuring the forecast error – the
time weighted consensus methodology based on a 100-day
time window is superior to the mean and median consensus
approach. As the results of the study demonstrate, across
the Asia-Pacific region, the time weighted consensus signal
seems to be a more accurate and reliable measure in
forecasting company EPS. This result is true across sectors
as well as throughout different time periods and varying
economic conditions. We may therefore conclude that in
Asia-Pacific, the time weighted forecast EPS signal tends
to exhibit valuable predictive properties. Such evidence
is consistent with our earlier proposition that naively
calculating analyst forecast consensus by averaging individual
analyst forecasts is, to say the least, inappropriate. Not all
analysts are the same; in fact they are characterised by a
varying level of skills, experience, coverage and frequency of
updates.Thus, proposing a more sophisticated technique for
calculating EPS consensus estimates is crucial.

Barefield and Comiskey (1975), little research effort has
been directed to either the nature or the role of analysts’
forecasts of EPS, although such forecasts seem to be a
key element in the formulation of investment decisions.
Additional research efforts could focus on a variety of issues
related to earnings forecasts. Although the time weighting
approach seems to be an effective proxy for conviction in
analyst views, a number of other analyst variables could also
be explored and include the following.
First, it would be meaningful to construct consensus made
up of the most active forecasters. According to Givoly and
Lakonishok (1979), the selection of the revisions produced
by the most active forecaster for each company (the one
with the greatest number of revisions) as the representative
of the group of forecasters. The most active forecaster is
likely to specialise in the stock and be the first to respond
to new information. Second, it would also be useful to
investigate forecast accuracy by industry, thus further
breaking down the sectors. It may be the case that different
industries pose different forecasting problems for analysts.
There may be significant differences in forecast errors for
different industries and even for different firms within the
same industry. In fact, there are analysts who focus their
attention on specific industries and who release forecasts
only for firms within those industries. As one would
reasonably expect, “such specialisation would enable the
analyst to focus their resources in a narrow area with
the aim of producing more accurate forecasts” (Richards,
1976, p.356). Third, one could find valuable the study of the
correlation between broker/analyst ‘celebrity’ status or high
survey ranking and their forecast accuracy. Fourth, taking
into account the analysts’ historical forecast accuracy could
also generate meaningful implications for deriving a robust
consensus measure for forecasting EPS. Fifth, examining the
forecast error by large brokers/analysts over that of the
small brokers/analysts could produce important inferences
for effective consensus construction. This could include,
among other topics, the number of stocks covered by the
analyst as well as the level of industry experience. Last but
not least, the magnitude of the revision would be studied.
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As the topic of analysts’ forecasts is rather vast, there are
a number of areas for further research. We outline some
possible future research directions below. As noted by
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Appendix A. Industry Classification by Sector
Sector
Basic Materials

Capital Goods

Cyclical

Energy
Financials

Health
Non-Cyclical
Services

Technology

Transport
Utilities

Industry
Chemical Manufacturing, Chemicals – Plastics and Rubber, Containers and
Packaging, Fabricated Plastic and Rubber, Forestry and Wood Products, Gold
and Silver, Iron and Steel, Metal Mining, Non-Metallic Mining, Paper and Paper
Products, Miscellaneous Fabricated Products.
Aerospace & Defence, Construction – Supplies & Fixtures, Construction and
Agricultural Machinery, Construction – Raw Materials, Construction Services,
Mobile Homes & RVs, Miscellaneous Capital Goods.
Apparel and Accessories, Tools and Appliances, Audio and Video Equipment,
Auto and Truck Manufacturers, Auto and Truck Parts, Footwear, Furniture and
Fixtures, Jewellery and Silverware, Photography, Recreational Products, NonApparel Textiles, Tires.
Coal, Oil and Gas (Integrated), Oil and Gas Operations, Oil Well Services and
Equipment.
Consumer Financial Services, Insurance (Accident and Health, Life, Property and
Casualty, Miscellaneous), Investment Services, Miscellaneous Financial Services,
Money Centre Banks, Regional Banks, S&Ls/Savings Banks.
Biotechnology and Drugs, Healthcare Facilities, Major Drugs, Medical Equipment
and Supplies.
Beverages (Alcoholic and Non-alcoholic), Crops, Fish and Livestock, Food
Processing, Office Supplies, Personal and Household Prods, Tobacco.
Advertising, Broadcasting and Cable TV, Business Services, Casinos and Gaming,
Communications Services, Hotels and Motels, Motion Pictures, Personal
Services, Printing and Publishing, Printing Services, Real Estate Operations,
Recreational Activities, Rental and Leasing, Restaurants, Retail (Apparel,
Catalogue and Mail Order, Department and Discount, Drugs, Grocery, Specialty,
Technology), Schools, Security Systems and Services, Waste Management
Services.
Communications Equipment, Computer Hardware, Computer Networks,
Computer Peripherals, Computer Services, Computer Storage Devices,
Electronic Instruments and Controls, Office Equipment, Scientific and Technical
Instruments, Semiconductors, Software and Programming.
Air Courier, Airline, Miscellaneous Transportation, Railroads, Trucking, Water
Transportation.
Electric Utilities, Natural Gas Utilities, Water Utilities.
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Appendix B. Calculating the Time-Weighted Consensus Estimate
The time weighted estimate is calculated by multiplying the individual analyst estimate on the day by its respective weight. The
older the estimate, the smaller its allocated weight.
For example, if the last estimate by analyst A was $3.48 and was issued 56 days ago, then the weight assigned to this estimate
= (100 – 56) / 100 = 0.44.
The time weighted estimate for this day is obtained by multiplying an EPS estimate of $3.48 by its weight 0.44, which returns
$1.53.
Thus, in obtaining the consensus figure for the day, the 56 day old measure will be given less priority than a measure that is, for
example, only 4 days old.
In an attempt to avoid confusion, we provide the following scenario as an example.
Analyst
Analyst A
Analyst B
Analyst C
Analyst D

Estimate
$3.48
$3.45
$4.02
$4.15

Age of Estimate
56 days old
4 days old
22 days old
103 days old

Weight of Estimate
0.44
0.96
0.78
0

As mentioned in the paper, any analyst forecast that is more than 100 days old shall be considered too old, assigned the value
of zero and is eliminated from the consensus calculation. Therefore, under the given scenario, the time weighted consensus
figure for a given day is calculated in the following way:
Step
1

Task
Calculate the time
weighted estimate for
each analyst on the day

2

Calculate the sum of the
time weighted estimates
for all analysts on the day
Calculate the sum of
weights of all analysts on
the day
Calculate the time
weighted consensus figure
on the day

3

4

Example
Analyst A: $3.48 × 0.44 = $1.53
Analyst B: $3.45 × 0.96 = $3.31
Analyst C: $4.02 × 0.78 = $3.14
Analyst D: $4.15 × 0
= $0
$1.53 + $3.31 + $3.14 + $0 = $7.98

0.44 + 0.96 + 0.78 + 0 = 2.18

REFERENCES

Abarbanell, J 1991, ‘Do Analysts’ Earnings Forecasts Incorporate
Information in Prior Stock Price Changes?’, Journal of Accounting
and Economics, vol. 14, no. 2, pp. 147–165.
Abarbanell, J & Bernard, V 1992, ‘Test of Analysts’ Overreaction
/Underreaction to Earnings Information as an Explanation for
Anomalous Stock Price Behavior’, Journal of Finance, vol. 47, no.
3, pp. 1181–1207.

$7.98 / 2.18 = $3.66

Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 115–129.
Arnold, M & Orthman, J 2011, ‘Behavioural Finance’, The
Australian, 7 September, viewed 12 November 2012, <http://
www.theaustralian.com.au/business/wealth/behavioural-finance/
story-e6frgac6-1226127680187.>
Axelson, K S 1975, ‘A Businessman’s Views on Disclosures’,
Journal of Accountancy, vol. 140, no. 1, pp. 42–46.

Abdel-khalik, A & Ajinkya, A 1982, ‘Returns to Informational
Advantages:The Case of Analysts’ Forecast Revisions’, Accounting
Review, vol. 57, no. 4, pp. 661–680.

Barefield, R & Comiskey, E 1975, ‘The Accuracy of Analysts’
Forecasts of Earnings Per Share’, Journal of Business Research, vol.
3, no. 3, pp. 241–252.

Allen, A, Cho, J Y & Jung, K 1997, ‘Earnings Forecast Errors:
Comparative Evidence from the Pacific Basin Capital Markets’,

Basi, B, Carey, K & Twark, R 1976,‘A Comparison of the Accuracy
of Corporate and Security Analysts’ Forecasts of Earnings’,
JARAF / VOLUME 8 ISSUE 2 20123 / 45

JOURNAL OF APPLIED RESEARCH IN ACCOUNTING AND FINANCE

Accounting Review, vol. 52, no. 2, pp. 244–254.
Bowen, R M, Johnson, M, Shelvin, T & Shores, D 1992,
‘Determinants of Quarterly Earnings Announcements’, Journal
of Accounting, Auditing and Finance, vol. 7, no. 4, pp. 395–422.
Bradshaw, M T 2011, ‘Analysts Forecasts: What Do We Know
after Decades of Work?’, viewed 9 October 2011, <http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.abstract_id1880339
Brealey, R A, Myers, S C & Allen, F 2008, Principles of Corporate
Finance: Corporate Financing and the Six Lessons of Market Efficiency,
8th ed, McGraw–Hill, Irwin.
Brown, L D & Kim, K J 1991, ‘Timely Aggregate Analyst Forecasts
as Better Proxies for Market Earnings Expectations’, Journal of
Accounting Research, vol. 29, no. 2, pp. 382–385.
Brown, L D & Rozeff, M S 1978, ‘The Superiority of Analyst
Forecasts as Measures of Expectations: Evidence from Earnings’,
Journal of Finance, vol. 33, no. 1, pp. 1–16.
Brown, P, Foster, G & Noreen, E W 1985, Security Analyst Multi-Year
Earnings Forecasts and the Capital Market, Studies in Accounting
Research, American Accounting Association, Sarasota, Florida.
Brown, L D, Griffin, P A, Hagerman, R L & Zmijewski, M E 1987,
‘Security Analyst Superiority Relative to Univariate Time-Series
Models in Forecasting Quarterly Earnings’, Journal of Accounting
and Economics, vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 61–87.
Brown, L D, Hagerman, R L, Griffin, P A & Zmijewski, M E
1987, ‘An Evaluation of Alternative Proxies for the Market’s
Assessment of Unexpected Earnings’, Journal of Accounting and
Economics, vol. 9, no. 2, pp. 159–193.
Butler, K C & Lang, L H 1991,‘The Forecast Accuracy of Individual
Analysts: Evidence of Systematic Optimism and Pessimism’,
Journal of Accounting Research, vol. 29, no. 1, pp. 150–156.
Clement, M B & Tse, S Y 2005, ‘Financial Analyst Characteristics
and Herding Behavior in Forecasting’, Journal of Finance, vol. 60,
no. 1, pp. 307–341.
Clement, M B 1999, ‘Analyst Forecast Accuracy: Do Ability,
Resources, and Portfolio Complexity Matter?’ Journal of
Accounting and Economics, vol. 27, no. 3, pp. 285–303.

De Bondt,W & Thaler, R 1990,‘Do Security Analysts Overreact?’
American Economic Review, vol. 80, no. 2, pp. 52–57.
De Bondt, W 1991, ‘Security Analysts. A Definition’, viewed
8 May 2012 <http://behavioralfinance.depaul.edu/docs/
PublicationsResources/223.pdf>.
De Bondt, W & Thaler, R 1985, ‘Does the Stock Market
Overreact?’ Journal of Finance, vol. 40, no. 3, pp. 793−808.
Doran, D T 1995. ‘Earnings Performance and Interim Reporting’,
Journal of Applied Business Research, vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 67−72.
Doran, D T 2000, ‘Methodological Choices In Detecting
Divergent Earnings’, Journal of Applied Business Research, vol. 16,
no. 3, pp. 113–123.
Dunn, K & Nathan, S 2005, ‘Analyst Industry Diversification and
Earnings Forecast Accuracy’, Journal of Investing, vol. 14, no. 2, pp.
7–14.
Easterwood, J & Nutt, S 1999, ‘Inefficiency in Analysts’ Earnings
Forecasts: Systematic Misreaction or Systematic Optimism?’,
Journal of Finance, vol. 54, no. 5, pp. 1777–1797.
Foster,
G
2nd
edition,

1986,
Financial
Statement
Analysis,
Englewood
Cliffs,
Prentice
Hall.

Francis, J C 1972, Investments: Analysis and Management, McGrawHill Book Co, New York.
Francis, J & Philbrick, D 1993, ‘Analysts’ Decisions as Products of
a Multi-task Environment’, Journal of Accounting Research, vol. 31,
no. 2, pp. 216−230.
Fried, D & Givoly, D 1982, ‘Financial Analysts’ Forecasts of
Earnings: A Better Surrogate for Market Expectations’, Journal of
Accounting and Economics, vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 85–107.
Fromlet, H 2001, ‘Behavioral Finance – Theory and Practical
Application’, Business Economics, vol. 36, no. 3, pp. 63−69.
Gonedes, N J, Dopuch, N & Penman, S H 1976, ‘Disclosure
Rules, Information-Production, and Capital Market Equilibrium:
The Case of Forecast Disclosure Rules’, Journal of Accounting
Research, vol. 14, no. 1, pp. 89–137.

Conlisk, J 1996, ‘Why Bounded Rationality?’, Journal of Economic
Literature, vol. 34, no. 2, pp. 669−700.

Givoly, D & Lakonishok, J 1979, ‘The Information Content of
Financial Analysts’ Forecasts of Earnings’, Journal of Accounting
and Economics, vol. 1, no. 3, pp. 165–185.

Crichfield, T, Dyckman T & Lakonishok, J 1978, ‘An Evaluation of
Security Analysts’ Forecasts’, Accounting Review, vol. 53, no. 3, pp.
651–668.

Gleason, C & Lee, C 2003, ‘Analyst Forecast Revisions and
Market Price Discovery’, Accounting Review, vol. 78, no.1, pp.
193–225.

Dargham, N A S 2009, ‘The Implications of Behavioral Finance’,
viewed 20 November 2012, <http://www.fgm.usj.edu.lb/files/
a102009.pdf>.

Graham, B 1959, The Intelligent Investor: A Book of Practical Counsel,
3rd edition, Harper and Brothers, New York.

Das, S, Guo, R & Zhang, H 2006, ‘Analysts’ Selective Coverage
and Subsequent Performance of Newly Public Firms’, Journal of
Finance, vol. 61, no. 3, pp. 1159−1185.

Grossman, S J & Stiglitz, L E 1980. ‘On the Impossibility of
Informationally Efficient Benchmarks’, American Economic Review,
vol. 70, no. 3, pp. 393–408.
Hong, H, Kubik, J & Solomon, A 2000, ‘Security Analysts’ Career

46 / JARAF / VOLUME 8 ISSUE 2 2013

Concerns and Herding of Earnings Forecasts’, RAND Journal of
Economics, vol. 31, no. 1, pp. 121–144.

O’Brien, P C 1988,‘Analysts’ Forecasts as Earnings Expectations’,
Journal of Accounting and Economics, vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 53–83.

Hong, H & Kubik, J 2003, ‘Analyzing the Analysts: Career
Concerns and Biased Earnings Forecasts’, Journal of Finance, vol.
58, no.1, pp. 313–351.

O’Brien, P C 1990, ‘Forecast Accuracy of Individual Analysts in
Nine Industries’, Journal of Accounting Research, vol. 28, no. 2, pp.
286–304.

Hughes, J S & Ricks, W E 1987, ‘Associations Between Forecast
Errors and Excess Returns Near to Earnings Announcements’,
Accounting Review, vol. 62, no. 1, pp. 158–175.

Odean, T 1999, ‘Do Investors Trade Too Much?’ American
Economic Review, vol. 89, no. 5, pp. 1279−1298.

Jacobs, B I and Levy, K N 1989, ‘The Complexity of the Stock
Market’, Journal of Portfolio Management, vol. 16, no. 1, pp. 19–27.
Jaggi, B & Jain, R 1998, ‘An Evaluation of Financial Analysts’
Earnings Forecasts for Hong Kong Firms’, Journal of International
Financial Management and Accounting, vol. 9, no. 3, pp. 177–200.
Kahneman, D & Tversky, A 1979, ‘Prospect Theory: An Analysis
of Decision under Risk’, Econometrica, vol. 47, no. 2, pp. 263–292.
Kahneman, D & Tversky, A 1996, ‘On the Reality of Cognitive
Illusions’, Psychological Review, vol. 103, no. 3, pp. 582–591.
Kahneman, D & Tversky, A 2000, Choices, Values, and Frames,
Cambridge University Press.
Kahneman, D & Riepe, M 1998, ‘Aspects of Investor Psychology’,
Journal of Portfolio Management, vol. 24, no. 4, pp. 52−65.
Lui, Y H 1992, ‘An Evaluation of Security Analysts’ Earnings
Forecasts: Hong Kong Evidence’, viewed 11 October 2012,
<www.cb.cityu.edu.hk/ef/getFileWorkingPaper.cfm?id=340>.
Lys,T & Sohn, S 1990,‘Association Between Revisions of Financial
Analysts’ Earnings Forecasts and Security Price Changes’, Journal
of Accounting and Economics, vol. 13, no. 4, pp. 341–363.
Lim, T 2001, ‘Rationality and Analysts’ Forecast Bias’, Journal of
Finance, vol. 56, no.1, pp. 369−385.
McDonald, C L 1973,‘An Empirical Examination of the Reliability
of Published Predictions of Future Earnings’, Accounting Review,
vol. 48, no. 3, pp. 502–510.
McNichols, M 1989, ‘Evidence of Informational Asymmetries
from Management Earnings Forecasts and Stock Returns’,
Accounting Review, vol. 64, no. 1, pp. 1–27.
Mendenhall, R R 2004, ‘Arbitrage Risk and Post-EarningsAnnouncement Drift’, Journal of Business, vol.77, no. 4, pp.
875−894.

Olsen, R 1998, ‘Behavioral Finance and Its Implications for Stock
Price Volatility’, Financial Analysts Journal, vol. 54, no. 2, pp. 10−18.
Pech, W & Milan, M 2009, ‘Behavioral Economics and the
Economics of Keynes’, Journal of Socio-Economics, vol. 38, no. 6,
pp. 891–902.
Phibrick, D R and Ricks, W E 1991, ‘Using Value Line and IBES
Analyst Forecasts in Accounting Research’, Journal of Accounting,
vol. 29, no. 2, pp. 397–417.
Richards, R M 1976, ‘Analysts’ Performance and the Accuracy of
Corporate Earnings Forecasts’, Journal of Business, vol. 49, no. 3,
pp. 350–357.
Schallke, R 1962, ‘Expected Income – A Reporting Challenge’,
Accounting Review, vol. 37, no. 4, pp. 670–676.
Scharfstein, D & Stein, J 1990, ‘Herd Behavior and Investment’,
American Economic Review, vol. 80, no. 3, pp. 465–479.
Schipper, K 1991, ‘Commentary on Analysts’ Forecasts’,
Accounting Horizons, vol. 5, no. 4, pp. 105–121.
Sewell, M 2011, ‘BF or BS?’, viewed 11 March 2010 http://
bs.behaviouralfinance.net/.
Shefrin, H & Statman, M 1986, ‘How Not to Make Money in the
Stock Market’, Psychology Today, viewed 9 October 2012, <http://
www.psychologytoday.com/magazine/archive?page=12>.
Shiller, R J 1998, ‘Human Behavior and Efficiency of the Financial
System’, National Bureau of Economic Research,Working Paper.
Shiller, R 2000, Irrational Exuberance. Princeton, Princeton
University Press.
Stefan, I 2009, ‘Testing the Efficient Markets Hypothesis: A
Behavioural Approach to the Current Economic Crisis’, Senior
Honors Thesis, University of California.
Stickel, S 1990, ‘Predicting Individual Analyst Earnings Forecasts’,
Journal of Accounting Research, vol. 28, no. 2, pp. 409–417.

Mest, D P & Plummer, E 2003, ‘Analysts’ Rationality and Forecast
Bias: Evidence from Sales Forecasts’, Review of Quantitative
Finance and Accounting, vol. 21, no. 2, pp. 103–122.

Theil, H 1966, Applied Economic Forecasts, North-Holland
Publishing Co, Amsterdam.

Mikhail, M, Walther, B & Willis, R 1997, ‘Do Security Analysts
Improve Their Performance with Experience?’ Journal of
Accounting Research, vol. 35, no. 3, pp. 131–157.

Trammell, S 2006, ‘Rethinking The Rational Man: Is Modern
Portfolio Theory Just A Special Case with Limited Significance?’,
CFA Magazine, vol. 17, no. 2, pp. 30−33.

O’Brien, P C 1985, ‘An Empirical Analysis of Analysts’ Forecasts
of Earnings Per Share’, PhD Dissertation, University of Chicago.

Trueman, B 1990, ‘On the Incentives for Security Analysts to
Revise Their Earnings Forecasts’, Contemporary Accounting
JARAF / VOLUME 8 ISSUE 2 20123 / 47

JOURNAL OF APPLIED RESEARCH IN ACCOUNTING AND FINANCE

Research, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 203–220.
Trueman, B 1994, ‘Analyst Forecasts and Herding Behavior’,
Review of Financial Studies, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 97–124.
Weber, M 1999, ‘Behavioral Finance’, Research for Practitioners,
University of Mannheim.
Zhang, J, Lin, E C & Shin, H 2010, ‘S&P 500 Index Inclusions and
Analysts’, Forecast Optimism’, Journal of Investing, vol. 19, no. 4,
pp. 50–57.

Alina Maydybura is from the School of Accounting and
Finance, University of Wollongong.
Dionigi Gerace is a Senior Lecturer in the School of
Accounting, Economics and Finance. Dionigi holds a Bachelor of
Statistics and Actuarial Studies from the University of Calabria,
Italy, a Masters in Finance and Economics as well as a PhD in
Mathematics from the University of Naples, Federico II, Italy.
Dionigi also holds a Diploma in Business and Accounting from
the Grimaldi Institute in Italy. He was formerly a Visiting Scholar
at the University of Sydney.
Brian Andrew is currently a professor of accounting and
finance at the University of Wollongong and adjunct professor of
taxation law and policy of the University of Canberra. Previously
he held chairs at Charles Darwin University, the University of
Western Sydney, University of Canberra and City University of
Hong Kong. He also served as head of department and Dean
at the University of Western Sydney-Macarthur and in similar
capacities at the University of Canberra. He has worked in many
Asian countries over the past twenty years and has conducted
research into external reporting issues, capital markets and
taxation law and policy in Australia and the Asia-Pacific region.
He has taught tax in universities in Australia, Hong Kong and
Singapore.

48 / JARAF / VOLUME 8 ISSUE 2 2013

